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Most analysis of how the distribution of political power affects the patterns of growth has been
confined to the late-twentieth century. One problem associated with a focus on the modern record is that
processes that take place over the long run are not examined. We may all agree that institutions concerned
with the distribution of political power have an impact on growth, but our interpretation of the
relationship will vary with our understanding of where institutions come from: to what degree are
institutions exogenous, and to what degree are they endogenous. This paper contributes to our knowledge
of where institutions have come from by examining how the rules governing the extension of suffrage,
a key measure of the distribution of political influence, evolved over time within the United States and
across the societies of the Americas.
We have previously argued that there was enormous variation in the initial extent of inequality
across the New World colonial societies established by the Europeans because of differences in their
factor endowments present early in their histories. Moreover, these initial differences in inequality may
have persisted over time if they affected the ability of elites to obtain disproportionate political leverage,
and to shape legal frameworks and state policies to advantage themselves relative to others in terms of
access to economic and other opportunities. In this paper, we show that the early patterns of the extension
of the franchise, the proportions of the respective populations voting, and other aspects of the conduct of
elections are indeed generally consistent with the notion that the extent of initial inequality and population
heterogeneity was associated across societies -- even within the United States -- with the nature of the
political institutions that evolved. Specifically, where there was greater inequality, the proportion of the
population that had the right to vote was generally lower, and the timing of the extensions of this right
from elite groups to a broad population generally later, than in areas where there was relative
homogeneity in the population.
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It has long been recognized that the conduct of elections, including who holds the 
right to vote, is one of the most crucial of institutions.  Varying the rules or organization 
of how votes are cast and of who casts them can have a fundamental impact on the policy 
choices that the elected representatives ￿ who in some sense constitute the collective 
government of the electors ￿ make.  Given that governments generally have a monopoly 
of power over certain important activities, there are often major implications for how a 
society￿s resources or wealth is distributed across the population, as well as for the pace 
of economic growth.  Given what is at stake, it should not be surprising that throughout 
history many have fought and died over both the design of the rules and the outcomes of 
elections. 
  In recent years there has been an increased appreciation of how democratic rules 
for electing government representatives might contribute to different paths of 
development.  A number of specific mechanisms have been identified.
1  Many scholars 
have emphasized the relation between the degree of democracy, or the distribution of 
political influence, and the distribution of income, with reference to how the nature of the 
franchise would lead to different types of tax systems, provisions of public services, legal 
and regulatory frameworks, levels of corruption, and trade policies.
2  Implicit in these 
treatments have been suggestions that policies with effects on distribution will have 
indirect consequences on the prospects for long-term economic growth as well.  Some 
have focused on potential negative consequences, such as the disincentives for investment 
that are created by progressive or higher rates of taxation, and infringements giving rise to 
insecure property rights to the streams of income from investments.  Where an economic 
elite wields highly disproportionate political power, or a political elite exploits its  2
position for economic advantage, a broadening of political influence through an extension 
of the franchise might diminish the returns to members of the elite and dampen their rates 
of investment.
3  On the other hand, there could well be advantages for growth to having a 
more equal distribution of political influence. An extension of political power beyond an 
elite to a broad spectrum of the population might, for example, be expected to lead to 
greater investment in infrastructure and other public goods and services conducive to 
growth (such as schooling), a reduction in levels of corruption, a wider participation of 
the population in commercial activity and economic matters generally, and perhaps more 
competition throughout the economy.
4  Why a political elite chooses to concede more 
formal influence to other groups, and whether the conditions that encourage it to do so are 
related to the potential impact of the change on long-term development, are also key 
issues.              
  Most of the systematic analysis of how the distribution of political power affects 
the patterns of growth has been confined to experience over the late-twentieth century.
5  
This work has made important contributions to our knowledge, but the lack of 
comparable data has hampered investigation of earlier periods.  One of the problems 
associated with the focus on the modern record is that processes that take place over the 
long run tend to be neglected.   An example of this deficiency is the difficulty of studying 
where institutions such as those that establish the distribution of political power come 
from.  We may all agree that institutions have an impact on growth, but our interpretation 
of the  relationship between any particular institution and growth will vary with our 
understanding of where institutions come from; in particular, to what extent are  3
institutions exogenous, and to what extent are they endogenous (and with respect to 
which conditions and processes)?  
This paper is intended to make a modest contribution toward the goal of 
improving our knowledge of where institutions have come from by surveying how the 
rules governing the extension of suffrage, a key measure of the distribution of political 
power, have differed across the countries of North and South America, as well as evolved 
over time within them.   Because of the enormous shocks to these societies associated 
with European colonization of the New World, and to the substantial variation among 
them in their initial characteristics and outcomes, such an examination has the potential 
for improving our understanding of the conditions that over the long run give rise to more 
democratic political institutions.  Moreover, it should also allow us a better chance at 
getting at the underlying processes that relate the degree of political democracy or 
equality to the evolution of strategic economic institutions, and thus to economic 
development more generally.   
That there was extreme variation across the New World in the evolution of social 
and economic institutions cannot be doubted.  Over the sixteenth through the eighteenth 
centuries, the Europeans had established colonies throughout the Americas as part of a 
worldwide effort to economically exploit underpopulated or underdefended territories.  
Nations and private agents, often with national support, set about extracting economic 
and other advantages from unfamiliar types of environments, and there was great 
diversity in the characteristics of the societies and institutions that evolved.  Common to 
all of the New World colonies was a high marginal product of labor and, for that era, per 
capita income.  Among the crucial dimensions in which colonies differed, however, was  4
in the homogeneity of the population and in the extent of inequality in the distributions of 
income and human capital.
6   
We have previously argued that the substantial variation across these colonies in 
the initial degrees of inequality can be largely attributed to factor endowments broadly 
conceived.
7  Extreme inequality arose in the colonies of the Caribbean and in Brazil, 
because their soils and climates gave them a comparative advantage in growing sugar and 
other lucrative crops that were produced at lowest cost on large slave plantations.  With 
the consequent importation of enormous numbers of slaves, their populations came to be 
composed of a small elite of European descent with the dominant share of the population 
consisting of black slaves, or (later) non-white freedmen and their descendants.  Extreme 
inequality in wealth and human capital came to characterize much of Spanish America as 
well.  The inequality arose here from the large populations of Native Americans and the 
Spanish practices (which were influenced by pre-existing Native-American organizations 
in Mexico and Peru) of awarding claims on land, native labor, and rich mineral resources 
to members of the elite (whose number were limited by restrictive immigration policies), 
but some societies, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, were less affected.  In 
contrast, the societies of the northern part of North America developed with relative 
equality and population homogeneity, as there were relatively few Native Americans and 
the climates and soils favored a regime of mixed farming centered on grains and livestock 
which exhibited quite limited economies of scale in production.          
Contemporary estimates indicating that Latin America has, as a region, the 
greatest degree of income inequality in the world today make it clear that the extreme 
disparities of the colonial era have persisted.
8  We have hypothesized that inequality in  5
political influence may have been a powerful contributor to the maintenance of this 
condition, and that such inequality in political power was rooted in the exceptional 
economic inequality and population heterogeneity that prevailed during the early histories 
of these societies.  Our contention is that to the extent that elites in any society were able 
to obtain disproportionate political leverage, their efforts could shape legal frameworks 
and state policies in such a way as to advantage themselves relative to others because of 
enhanced access to economic and other opportunities.  What some have called ￿political 
cronyism￿ would have privileged the individuals in question, as well as their families and 
children, and encouraged the persistence of inequality ￿ relative to what would transpire 
in a society that began with relative equality.  What was in the private interests of 
members of the elite may not, however, have been conducive to the growth of the overall 
economy.       
In what follows, it is shown that the early patterns of the extension of the 
franchise, the proportions of the respective populations voting, and other aspects of the 
conduct of elections are generally consistent with the notion that the extent of initial 
inequality and population heterogeneity was associated across societies ￿ even within the 
United States and amongst the nations of Latin America -- with the nature of the political 
institutions that evolved.  Specifically, where there was greater inequality and/or 
heterogeneity, the proportion of the population that had the right to vote was generally 
lower, and the timing of the extensions of this right from elite groups to a broad 
population generally later, than in areas where there was either relative homogeneity in 
the population or a scarcity of labor.   These relationships, which seem to have held both 
across the individual states of the United States as well as across the hemisphere, are all  6
the more striking because most of the New World societies were at least nominally 
democracies by the middle of the nineteenth century, and had embraced the rhetoric of 
revolution and modernization during their respective movements for independence.  Only 
a few, however, would extend to most of the population the right to vote and to political 
influence until the twentieth century. 
 
II 
  Despite the sentiments popularly attributed to the Founding Fathers of the United 
States, the formal or conceptual differences across New World societies in who had the 
right to participate in community decisions were not all that large as late as the end of the 
eighteenth century.  The British colonies on the mainland, like those elsewhere in the 
hemisphere, reserved the privilege of voting to white adult men with significant holdings 
of real estate, although differences in the extent of inequality in landholding across 
colonies as well as in the specified thresholds meant that the same sort of limitation on 
the franchise implied very different proportions of the population eligible to vote.
9  This 
practice was rooted in a philosophy that can be traced back at least as far as medieval 
Britain in which the right to vote was reserved to ￿freeholders￿, who because of their 
stake in land had more of a long-term interest in the welfare of the community (as 
compared to mere ￿freemen￿) and thus the right to be a decision-maker and voter.
10  It 
treated communities as akin to business corporations, both in England and in its colonies, 
where perhaps this consideration was more appropriate.  Landowners were regarded as 
analogous to shareholders, and entitled to vote; indeed, even non-residents were 
frequently permitted to vote where they owned property. Over time, as the colonies  7
became more diverse socially and economically, the restrictions on the suffrage evolved 
to take account of the more complex society.  
It is difficult to identify a single guiding philosophy that guided the changes in the 
qualifications for suffrage across the British mainland colonies.  Instead, two general 
considerations might be said to have framed the political debates, with their relative 
influences varying over context.  One focused on the individual and was concerned with 
what characteristics gave a person the ￿right to vote￿; was it the ownership of property, 
the payment of taxes, residency, or simply being an adult white male.  The other general 
consideration in setting the qualifications was what would be good for the community or 
the society.  Would it be in the best interests of the society for non-residents, non-
property holders, women, illiterates, criminals, or non-church members to be allowed to 
vote?  Overall, the dominant trend over the colonial period was the movement away from 
the idea that the right to vote should be based solely on the ownership of land. There was 
a growing appreciation of how suffrage qualifications specified along this single 
dimension might exclude otherwise appropriate individuals, especially in urban settings, 
and as well as allow members of undesirable groups to vote.  Over time, colonies began 
to introduce means of substituting other assets to meet property requirements, and this 
development ultimately led to the acceptance of economic qualifications based on the 
amount of tax payments.  In no colony, however, did there appear to have been a serious 
challenge to the notion that suffrage should be restricted to property owners.
11  
All thirteen colonies maintained some sort of property qualification for the 
franchise on the eve of the American Revolution.  Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, 
New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island had minimum real estate  8
requirements, specified in terms of either acreage or value.  The remaining six colonies 
allowed for more flexibility, with the property requirement allowing either landholding, 
ownership of some other property exceeding a specified minimum, or (in the case of 
South Carolina) payment of a certain amount of taxes.  Given the issues at stake in the 
conflict between the thirteen colonies and Britain, as well as within the colonies, it should 
not be surprising that the question of suffrage reform was central to many of the intense 
debates about the organization of state governments that were sparked by the need for the 
now independent colonies to establish frameworks for governance.  Although some 
states, such as Rhode Island, merely carried over the voting qualifications in place during 
the colonial era, eight of the thirteen made substantial changes through the constitutions 
they adopted during the Revolutionary era.  Most moved in the direction of expanding the 
franchise somewhat, such as by providing for alternative ways of meeting standards for 
property holders or adopting differential requirements for elections to different posts 
(such as New York￿s having higher property requirements for the election of state 
senators and the governor than for the election of members of its assembly), but only 
Pennsylvania eliminated wealth qualifications (replacing them with a taxpaying 
requirement).
12  The paucity of detailed information on the distribution of wealth makes it 
difficult to construct estimates of what the effects of these changes on the size of the legal 
electorate were, but even those scholars who argue that the legal changes were important 
seem to believe their de facto effects were modest.
13  Although it is not clear how 
stringently the economic requirements were enforced, it is telling that many of those who 
opposed wealth-based suffrage qualifications argued that they were difficult to administer 
because the amount of wealth held by an individual could change quickly (especially in  9
areas with rapid population growth), and decisions about valuation often involved some 
degree of arbitrariness.   That there were protracted political struggles, waged both inside 
and outside of state constitutional conventions, over the fixing of the requirements for the 
suffrage and the procedures for registration suggests that the laws made a difference in 
who was able to vote.  Nevertheless, in cases where the desire to vote was intense and the 
distinctions to be drawn between individuals fine if not minute, something less than 
rigorous application of the requirements might have seemed prudent to the authorities.    
In general, the major break of doing away with all suffrage qualifications related 
to property or economic standing more generally, was led by new states entering the 
Union (see Table 1). Not a single state that entered the Union after the original thirteen 
had a property requirement for the franchise, and although a few adopted a tax-based 
qualification, it was only in Louisiana that the restriction was a serious constraint and 
endured very long.  Most of the original thirteen (all but Rhode Island, Virginia, and 
North Carolina) had done away with property qualifications by the middle of the 1820s, 
but tax-based requirements for suffrage (and for the holding of public office) lingered on 
in many of them into the middle of the nineteenth century and beyond.  Also striking is 
that of the states formed of the originally settled areas, it was those that were sparsely 
settled and on the fringe (Vermont, New Hampshire, and Georgia) that seem to have 
taken the lead in doing away with all economic-based qualifications for the franchise.  
The spirit of the Revolution undoubtedly contributed to the movement for the 
extension of the franchise, but the rather systematic pattern of where the changes were 
made seems significant and deserves attention.
14  Why were frontier states more liberal in 
extending the franchise than the original states that had long been settled?  One possible TABLE 1 
 




   Qualification in 1787      Year Economic 






New  Hampshire    Tax    1792 
Massachusetts       Property    1821 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Rhode Island        Property    1842 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Connecticut     Property   1818  (prop),  1845  (tax) 
New  York     Property   1821  (prop),  1826  (tax) 
New  Jersey     Property   1807  (prop),  1844  (tax) 
Pennsylvania        Tax                          tax req. in 1860 
Delaware        Property    1792 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Maryland     Property   1802   
Virginia     Property   1850 
North Carolina      Property    1856 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
South  Carolina   Tax    1810  (tax) 





Vermont     none  (1791) 
Kentucky     none  (1792) 
Tennessee     none  (1796) 
Ohio      Tax  (1803)   1851  (tax) 
Louisiana     Tax  (1812)   1845  (tax) 
Indiana      none  (1816)    
Mississippi     Tax  (1817)   1832  (tax) 
Illinois      none  (1818) 
Maine        none  (1819)    
Alabama     none  (1819) 




Sources and Notes:  Porter 1918; Williamson 1960; and Keyssar 2000.  Tax req. in 1860 
means that a tax-based qualification for suffrage was still in effect in that year.  10
explanation is that the U.S. Constitution and Congress had laid out a process for new 
states to join the Union and that process may have favored the adoption of state 
constitutions with universal white male suffrage.
15  Although this hypothesis certainly has 
some relevance, the initial policy laid out in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (reaffirmed 
in 1789 by the first Congress) specified a freehold requirement for suffrage that held for 
elections of territorial governments as well as of delegates to constitutional conventions.  
Such a law would not seem to necessarily to bias new states toward universal white male 
suffrage.  The freehold requirement held until 1811, when Congress ￿ spurred by 
concerns of territories that relatively few of their residents could meet the freehold 
requirement ￿ replaced it with a taxpaying requirement for all territorial residents (aliens 
as well as U.S. citizens).  Thus, the pattern of frontier areas or new states choosing to 
extend the franchise more broadly than their neighboring states to the East does not 
appear to have been driven by the preferences of the U.S. Congress, but rather by 
conditions in those states. 
 A quite distinctive feature of the frontier areas that might be expected to 
encourage them to place fewer restrictions on who had the right to vote was a scarcity of 
labor.  Nearly all of the residents of such territories or states, and certainly property 
holders and the elite more generally, would have had a strong interest in attracting more 
people to settle there.  If the right to participate in the political process was desirable to 
potential migrants, the new states thus had an economic incentive to adopt liberal suffrage 
provisions as a lure.
16  The right to vote may not in itself have been sufficiently powerful 
to induce a potential migrant to settle in a particular territory, but frontier states typically 
offered many other enticements as well (some due to state or territorial laws and some  11
grounded in federal policies, as in the case of the Northwest Ordinance) including cheap 
land, generous provision of public services, and laws conducive to broad access to 
economic opportunities.
17  Moreover, once some of these states moved to liberalize the 
laws governing suffrage, other states may have felt pressure to alter their laws to remain 
competitive.  The precise basis for the record is admittedly unclear, but it need hardly be 
recounted that these early frontier states were indeed extremely successful at attracting 
migrants. 
Elites in labor-scarce frontier areas should have been more strongly motivated to 
attract migrants and stimulate population growth than their counterparts in long-settled 
areas, but there may have been other mechanisms at work linking labor scarcity to 
broader suffrage institutions as well.  For example, as one would expect in places with a 
relative abundance of land and scarcity of labor, frontier areas were characterized by 
greater equality or homogeneity among the population.
18  Either because of the political 
ideologies fostered by such homogeneity, the hazards of trying to define a meaningful and 
consequential threshold within a relatively continuous distribution, or because the amount 
of property owned at a particular point in time was not very informative of an individual￿s 
life course or commitment to his community in such settings, the greater equality in the 
new states may have made it more difficult to sustain a case for discriminating between 
otherwise rather similar individuals on the basis of wealth or economic standing.  Thus, 
while the relationship may have been the result of a variety of different processes, the 
observation that the new states were the leaders in doing away with wealth and other 
economic-based qualifications for the franchise is certainly not inconsistent with our  12
hypothesis about the importance of equality in accounting for the way institutions 
evolved.       
The actual attainment of universal white adult male suffrage, or doing away with 
all economic-based qualifications for the vote, began when Vermont and Kentucky joined 
the U.S. in 1791 and 1792.  Perhaps inspired by her neighbor, in 1792 New Hampshire -- 
which resembled a frontier area in many respects -- swept away the taxpaying 
qualification that it had previously (in 1784) adopted to replace a rather high property 
requirement.  Although serving to keep suffrage reform a live issue of political debate, 
these states did not immediately attract a flood of imitators, especially since both 
Pennsylvania and South Carolina had in 1790 adopted new state constitutions which 
maintained, in slightly weakened forms, qualifications that were primarily tax-based.  
During the last decade of the eighteenth century, Tennessee joined the Union with a 
freehold requirement (but one that was waived for those who had been resident for six 
months) for the suffrage, and Delaware and Georgia revised their laws to set the payment 
of a state or county tax, or of any assessed taxes, as the test.
19    
The suffrage issue was of course only one of a number of important issues that 
divided the population, and the political battles, if not alignments, were somewhat 
different in each state ￿ often not along party lines.  In general, however, the older states 
were where elites were slower to embrace the changes and political conflict was greatest 
(the salient examples include Massachusetts and New York); they were much slower to 
do away with economic-based restrictions on the franchise.  The new entrants to the 
Union, in contrast, very rarely adopted meaningful economic requirements for the 
suffrage during this era.  After Tennessee, the next state to join the Union was Ohio, in  13
1803, which required of its voters that they had paid a county tax or else worked out a tax 
on the public highway.  Louisiana became a state in 1812, with a landholding alternative 
to a relatively stringent tax qualification; anyone who had actually purchased land from 
the United States government had the right to vote, however, as long as he was a white 
male who had resided in the county in question for a year.  It was the only significant 
deviation from the pattern among new states, and it failed to follow the examples of its 
southern neighbors like Georgia, Maryland and South Carolina, which had formally or 
effectively done away with economic-based requirements and allowed white adult males 
to qualify for suffrage by length of residency in 1798,1802, and 1810 respectively.
20   
Louisiana notwithstanding, the innovations in suffrage laws over the first two 
decades of the United States signify a critical juncture.  The use of wealth as a basis for 
distinguishing who should vote was clearly becoming less viable, and the ultimate fate of 
such qualifications was becoming clear.
21  This did not mean, however, that there was 
opposition to all restrictions on who could vote.   The relatively homogeneous white male 
population might believe that differentiation on the basis of wealth was unfair, 
unreasonable, or inconsistent with basic rights, especially where wealth was relatively 
equally distributed and there was substantial social mobility, but they could support the 
exclusion of groups of the population that were obviously distinctive and arguably 
unsuitable for participating in community decisions: blacks, women, native Americans, 
the mentally ill, those with criminal records, and those (immigrants as well as native 
born) who had not long been resident in the county or state.
22  When there were wealth-
based restrictions, there had been no real need for provisions that dealt specifically with 
these classes, but as states eliminated or weakened the economic-based qualifications,  14
there was increasing emphasis on introducing or tightening qualifications that would keep 
them out of the electorate.  Indeed, it was typical for a package of reforms affecting the 
composition of the electorate to be adopted altogether, with the requirements for length of 
residence and mental health strengthened to offset the effects of lower economic-based 
qualifications.  The tightening of residency requirements is perhaps not very interesting 
(except that coupled with changes in the requirements for citizenry, this sometimes meant 
better access for immigrants to political influence), but it is notable that despite virtually 
all of the new states beyond the original thirteen entering the Union with weak or no 
economic-based requirements for the franchise, Kentucky (and it only for a brief period) 
and Vermont were the only ones that allowed blacks to vote.  The list of those that never 
allowed blacks to vote before the Fourteenth Amendment include California, Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, 
Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, as well as all of the southern states.  Moreover, at the same 
time that Delaware, Maryland, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania eased their 
economic qualifications, each altered their constitution to exclude blacks.  On the eve of 
the Civil War, the only states that extended the franchise to blacks were five in New 
England, where those of African descent were exceptionally rare, and New York (where a 
property requirement of $250 was applied to blacks, as compared to no requirement for 
whites).
23           
Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri were brought into the nation between 1815 and 
1820, and none had any suffrage qualification related to wealth or to tax payments.  There 
was little support within the relatively homogenous populations of the western states for 
drawing a line to distinguish the franchised from the disenfranchised among white adult  15
males; indeed, a modest proposal to require a tax payment was voted down resoundingly 
in the Missouri constitutional convention of 1820.  Indeed, after Ohio in 1803, no 
northern state admitted to the Union came in with a property or taxpaying qualification 
(and no southern state, after Mississippi in 1817).  Residency requirements, strictures on 
race, gender, and age, as well as disqualifications for infamous crimes were the only 
constraints on suffrage imposed in the more newly settled areas.  Elsewhere, the 
significance of property was definitely on the wane, but remained an issue. Maine, once 
part of Massachusetts, joined the U.S. in 1819, and its constitutional convention issued a 
public statement describing its stand on the question: ￿Pecuniary qualifications have been 
productive of little benefit; sometimes of injustice.  They are too often relaxed or strained 
to suit the purposes of the day.  The convention has therefore extended the right of 
suffrage, so that no person is disqualified for want of property unless he be a pauper.￿
24  
Of the two new southern states established during these years, Alabama made no 
reference to property in its suffrage laws, but Mississippi did adopt a requirement of 
either a tax payment or service in the state militia (one that was abandoned in 1832).  
Both devoted considerable attention to specifying which classes of the population could 
vote, and which -- mostly various classes of criminals -- could not.  Lines were 
continuing to be drawn, but the population was increasingly skeptical of basing them on 
purely pecuniary factors. 
Property- or tax-based qualifications were most strongly entrenched in the original 
thirteen states, and dramatic political battles took place at a series of prominent state 
constitutional conventions held in them during the late 1810s and 1820s.  For example, 
although the Committee on Elective Franchise to the New York State convention had  16
recommended in 1821 to abolish all property distinctions and require only virtue and 
morality of voters, opponents of universal suffrage put up a spirited defense.  After 
lengthy discussion, and a strong vote against an explicit property qualification, a 
compromise plan that offered a wide set of alternatives was enacted: a voter must have 
paid a state or county tax, or have performed military service, or have worked on a public 
highway, or have lived three years in the state (instead of the ordinary one-year 
requirement); in 1826, these qualifications were dispensed with in favor of universal 
white adult male suffrage for residents.
25   Another heated debate took place at the 
Massachusetts convention of 1820, where notables like John Adams and Joseph Storey 
warned of the consequences of extending the franchise.  Although their eloquence was 
not sufficient to save a property qualification, the new constitution did include a 
requirement that either a county or state tax had been paid. At an equally turbulent 
convention in 1829, with James Madison, James Monroe, and John Marshall 
participating, the delegates revised the Virginia constitution but maintained a   rather 
stringent property requirement (lasting until 1850).  In general, the changes in the laws 
governing suffrage were arrived at in the absence of violence.   Rhode Island, where 
protracted political conflict ultimately led in 1842 to civil strife quelled by federal troops, 
is the one exception; the reform adopted in that year included a stiff property requirement 
for those born outside of the United States.
26        
Vigorous struggles were necessary to do away with property or tax-based 
qualifications in the great majority of the original thirteen states, with the restrictions 
being progressively eroded ￿ often to the point of a token tax payment of a dollar or two. 
Because of our limited knowledge about patterns of wealth holding and of tax payments,  17
and because of shifts in the regional distribution of the population, it is difficult with the 
information available at present to construct precise estimates of how the eligible pool of 
voters changed over time.  As shown in Table 2, however, comparisons of the number of 
votes cast with the adult white male population indicate that a very high rate of voter 
participation was realized rather early in the nineteenth century.  These figures, which 
reproduce the estimates of Richard McCormick, suggest that by 1820 more than half of 
adult white males were casting votes in nearly all states except for those that still retained 
property requirements or substantial tax requirements for the franchise ￿ Virginia, Rhode 
Island, and New York as well as Louisiana.
27  McCormick￿s estimates are somewhat 
puzzling in that they reveal much higher voting rates in early non-presidential elections 
than in the presidential elections in which Andrew Jackson was a candidate, but he 
argued that local issues were much more important during this era and that presidential 
races were not generally contested seriously at the state level.  The traditional notion that 
it was Jackson and his Democratic Party that brought forth mass voting participation does 
not seem consistent with this evidence.
28  The estimates do, however, support the notion 
that broad participation coincided with the adoption of laws that extended suffrage.  As is 
reflected in the consistently lower voting rates of Rhode Island and Virginia (the two 
states that maintained property restrictions through 1840), part of the higher rates of the 
era were due to the changes in the laws governing suffrage.  But the figures also bolster 
the view that a broad mass of the population was interested in exercising political 
influence, and that this sentiment contributed to the way in which the suffrage institutions 
evolved.  Given the enthusiasm for voting that McCormick￿s figures suggest, it may have TABLE 2 
 
PERCENTAGES OF ADULT WHITE MALES VOTING IN ELECTIONS 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   H i g h e s t   %  
   %   A W M  
      Before 1824                            Presidential Elections  
 
      Year      %AWM  1824 1828 1832 1836 1840 1844  
 
Maine      1812  62.0   18.9 42.7 66.2 37.4 82.2 67.5 
New  Hampshire  1814  80.8   16.8 76.5 74.2 38.2 86.4 65.6 
Vermont    1812  79.9       -  55.8 50.0 52.5 74.0 65.7 
Massachusetts   1812  67.4   29.1 25.7 39.3 45.1 66.4 59.3 
Rhode  Island    1812  49.4   12.4 18.0 22.4 24.1 33.2 39.8  
Connecticut   1819  54.5   14.9 27.1 45.9 52.3 75.7 76.1 
 
New York    1810  41.5       -  70.4 72.1 60.2 77.7 73.6 
New  Jersey   1808  71.8   31.1 70.9 60.9 69.3 80.4 81.6 
Pennsylvania    1808  71.5   19.6 56.6 52.7 53.1 77.4 75.5 
Delaware    1804  81.9      -    -  67.0  69.4  82.8  85.0 
 
Maryland    1820  69.0   53.7 76.2 55.6 67.5 84.6 80.3 
Virginia    1800  25.9   11.5 27.6 30.8 35.1 54.6 54.5 
North Carolina      -     -    42.2  56.8  31.7  52.9  83.1  79.1 
Georgia    1812  62.3       -  35.9 33.0 64.9 88.9 94.0 
 
Kentucky    1820  74.4   25.3 70.7 73.9 61.1 74.3 80.3 
Tennessee    1817  80.0   26.8 49.8 28.8 55.2 89.6 89.6 
Louisiana    1812  34.2       -  36.3 24.4 19.2 39.4 44.7 
Alabama    1819  96.7   52.1 53.6 33.3 65.0 89.8 82.7 
Mississippi   1823  79.8   41.6 56.6 32.8 62.8 88.2 89.7 
 
Ohio      1822  46.5   34.8 75.8 73.8 75.5 84.5 83.6 
Indiana      1822  52.4   37.5 68.3 61.8 70.1 86.0 84.9 
Illinois      1822  55.8   24.2 51.9 45.6 43.7 85.9 76.3 
Missouri    1820  71.9   20.1 54.3 40.8 35.6 74.0 74.7 
 
NAT  AVG          26.5 56.3 54.9 55.2 78.0 74.9 
Sources and Notes:  McCormick 1960.  The elections that were conducted under a 
property-based requirement for the franchise appear in italics. In the cases of those states 
that maintained such requirements throughout the period, Rhode Island, Virginia, and 
North Carolina, the entire row appears in italics.  Although North Carolina had a property 
qualification in voting for certain state posts, there was none in the presidential elections.  The Louisiana figures also appear in italics, because McCormick characterized its tax-
based qualification as unusually stringent. The estimates of the highest proportions of 
adult males voting before 1824 were prepared by McCormick because of his desire to 
highlight how participation in the elections during the Jacksonian period was not 
exceptionally high. As McCormick recognized, it is potentially misleading to use the 
highest figure before 1824 as the basis for comparison, and the examination of the record 
over time is complicated by the changes that were made in the methods of electing 
governors and presidential electors, but he reports that the average voter participation 
before 1824 was obviously higher (than in the three Jackson elections) in Alabama, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Vermont.  Although he was not explicit, he implied that the figures he 
reported for the highest proportions of the adult male population voting before 1824 were 
generally registered in state and local elections.   18
been difficult for legislators or participants in constitutional conventions to resist the 
pressure to extend the suffrage.
29  
By 1840, there were only three states that retained a property qualification, North 
Carolina (for some state-wide offices only), Rhode Island, and Virginia, and North 
Carolina in 1856 was the last state to end the practice.  Tax-paying qualifications were 
also gone in all but a few states by the Civil War, but they did survive into the twentieth 
century in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
30  Poll taxes were revived during the 1890s 
and the first decade of the twentieth century, along with the introduction of literacy tests, 
as a number of southern states revised their constitutions or enacted new laws to sharply 
restrict voting by blacks.
31 This effort was successful, and the experience of blacks in the 
South ￿ when they were flagrantly denied equal access to public services -- during their 
period of disfranchisement even as a free people dramatizes how important the right to 
vote can be.
32  As obvious and consequential as this episode of systematic action to deny 
a salient social group a significant political voice was, what stands out from the U.S. 
record is how relatively rare such measures were ￿ at least as judged by the proportion of 
the population affected (compared to virtually all of the other societies in the 
hemisphere).  Women, blacks, and youth were the principal sufferers of restrictions on 
the franchise.  The relative absence of binding requirements on white male adult voters 
does not appear to have been due to philosophical positions that everyone or even every 
man had an innate right to vote.  Qualifications based on race, residency, as well as on 
criminal record and mental health, were too commonplace for the notion of voting being a 
basic right to hold.  On the contrary, the pattern by which such qualifications were 
introduced and stiffened as property and tax-based standards were relaxed or abandoned  19
suggests that the requirements for the franchise were being set through a process that 
accepted the drawing of lines but would change or vary them depending on 
circumstances.
33  As regards the question of what circumstances favored the universal 
white manhood suffrage, perhaps the most telling observation is that the western or 
frontier states, together with highly rural northern ones, were the first-movers.   
The weakening and ultimate removal of wealth-based restrictions on the franchise 
seems likely to have been an important contributor, together with the spread of more 
secrecy in balloting and other reforms in the conduct of elections, to a substantial increase 
in the fraction of the population voting in U.S. elections.  But it was only one. Although 
McCormick￿s figures suggest a reinterpretation may be in order, the age of Andrew 
Jackson is frequently depicted as one of broad advance in political participation, and the 
proportion of adult white males voting in presidential elections did rise sharply between 
1824 and 1840.  Whatever the distribution of responsibility, the U.S. had amongst the 
highest, if not the highest, proportion of the population voting in the world by the middle 
of the nineteenth century.  None of the Latin American countries would equal this rate of 
suffrage for another seventy-five years.  Indeed, throughout the hemisphere, only Canada, 
where similar movements for the extension of the franchise with similar outcomes lagged 
those in the U.S. by nearly a half-century, was much of a rival in political participation.   
As is evident from Table 3, in the middle of the nineteenth century the United 
States had perhaps one and a half times the rate of population voting as did Canada, and  
eight or more times the rate as elsewhere in the hemisphere (including the other British 
colonies, such as Barbados and Jamaica).  Given that most of these societies were at least 
nominal democracies, it is reasonable to ask where this extraordinary gap in the rate of  20
the fundamental political participation that is voting came from.  The chief issue, of 
course, is whether the gap in the proportions of the population voting were due to 
differences in the numbers eligible to vote under law, or to some other disparity in 
conditions, and if it was attributable to differences in qualifications for the suffrage, what 
accounted for the contrast in the laws?  Even a cursory examination of the requirements 
for voting elsewhere in the Americas is sufficient to demonstrate that they were much 
more restrictive than in the U.S. or Canada, and thus they would be expected to have had 
much lower rates of voting.  Not only were qualifications based on wealth or income very 
common, but the requirement of literacy came to be virtually universal in Latin America 
as well. These latter strictures, which were generally set forth as qualifications for being a 
citizen, effectively barred the great majority of wage-earners, whether urban or rural, and 
of Native Americans from voting.  In such a legal environment, and with extremely low 
literacy rates (perpetuated by lack of support for public schools until late in the nineteenth 
or the twentieth centuries) and with unequal distributions of land and wealth, it is not 
surprising that the proportions of the populations voting were no higher than 1 or 2 
percent until late in the nineteenth century.  Even the most progressive of the Latin 
American societies were seventy-five years behind the U.S. in voter participation. 
The exclusion of non-property owners from the standing to vote, and from other 
rights of citizens, by the independent Latin American nations continued in the tradition 
inherited from the political institutions and policies put in place during the colonial period 
by Spanish authorities.  Although the major figures in the Spanish colonial 
administrations were appointed by the Crown, or by its colonial representatives, 
municipal councils (cabildos) with elected members were allowed some significant  21
political jurisdiction (including authority to levy taxes) to provide local public services. 
Each typically -- though not always -- originated with a set of appointed council members 
drawn from prominent citizens (vecinos) of the municipality or pueblo, but was later 
extended through elections of members.  Participation in such elections (and frequently 
membership on the council as well as the holding of other offices) was generally 
restricted to substantial landowners (and sometimes even confined to the council 
members themselves).
34  In restricting the right to vote to an elite propertied class, the 
regulation of suffrage in the Spanish colonies resembled that in the English colonies but 
was much more restrictive with respect to the proportion of the population that had voting 
rights.  Given this history, it should perhaps not be surprising that after they gained 
independence, these societies ￿ again like their counterparts to the North ￿ continued to 
restrict the franchise on the basis of characteristics directly related to wealth.  
As with the states in the U.S., however, the nature and centrality of the suffrage 
qualifications based on wealth-related variables changed. Although systematic 
information allowing for quantitative assessment of patterns has not yet been retrieved, 
restrictions that had often been specified in terms of ownership of land during the colonial 
period were made more flexible after independence.  In both early constitutions, and 
increasingly over time, qualifications for voting were revised to encompass those who 
owned different types of property (other than land), satisfied an income threshold, or had 
a certain social standing or professional occupation.  Scholars of Latin America have 
often attributed these sorts of changes in post-independence political institutions to the 
interests of the criollo elite ￿ who had been at the forefront of the independence 
movement and whose power was very much enhanced by gaining independence from  22
Spain.  It is suggested that they were much broader in composition, if not distinct from, 
the major landowning families, and that they accordingly favored reducing the 
importance of land relative to other gauges of economic and social standing.
35   An 
alternative measure of status that came to be extensively employed in the laws was the 
ability to read and write ￿ a capacity that was quite rare in these societies, especially 
among Native Americans.  In time the literacy test evolved to become the dominant 
standard; for example, in its 1859 constitution, Chile considered literate males to have 
sufficient income to meet the qualification for the franchise.  
Indeed, the introduction and growing emphasis on a literacy requirement was the 
major change that occurred after independence in the laws governing the franchise. This 
development is remarkable not only for spreading rapidly throughout Latin America, but 
also for it being rather novel, at that time, for the New World.  Whereas a literacy 
qualification was not used in the U.S. until the 1890s, when the black population was 
targeted for disfranchisement in the South (as well as blacks and immigrants in the 
North), virtually all Latin American countries included a literacy requirement for 
citizenship (encompassing the right to vote) in their first constitution or soon afterward.  
For example: Bolivia advanced a literacy restriction in its 1826 constitution which was 
maintained beyond the 1945 constitution; Costa Rica had one in its first constitution as an 
independent state (1844) but eliminated it in 1913; Chile had a literacy requirement 
between 1833 and 1874, and then later from 1885 through 1970; Ecuador abandoned its 
property requirements for voters in its 1861 constitution, but replaced them with a literacy 
requirement (which endured until 1978); El Salvador had a literacy restriction in its first 
constitution as an independent state (1864), but seems to have eliminated it in 1945;  23
Guatemala had a literacy restriction in its first full constitution (1879), and maintained it 
through its 1945 constitution (when illiterates were given the right to a public vote ￿ 
illiterates with a profession were given the right to vote in 1935);  Mexico had a literacy 
qualification in its 1835 constitution, but did away with it in the 1857 constitution (which 
also nationalized church property and set off a civil war); Peru had a literacy qualification 
in its 1826 constitution that was largely maintained through 1979 (there have been more 
than twenty constitutions, and a few of them prior to 1979 relaxed the qualification albeit 
briefly); and Uruguay had a literacy requirement from  the 1830 constitution  until the 
1918 constitution.  Brazil, despite a different national heritage, also had property-based 
restrictions after independence, but replaced them with a literacy qualification in 1891; 
this restriction endured until 1988.  Overall, the only major Latin American countries that 
did not have had literacy requirements at the national level were Argentina and Colombia.  
In both of these cases, states or provinces were allowed considerable latitude in regulating 
elections and voting, and it seems that some did impose literacy qualifications.
36 
To an even greater extent than was the case in the United States, the requirements 
for suffrage seem to have made a difference in the rates of political participation across 
Latin America. This is apparent from Table 3 in that the countries with the most 
progressive suffrage laws (Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay ￿ which led in extending 
the franchise early in the 20
th century) having markedly higher rates of the population 
voting.  That the literacy restrictions could have had such a great impact on participation 
in elections is evident from the exceptionally low literacy rates in Latin America (see 
Table 4), and indeed nearly everywhere in the hemisphere except for the U.S. and 
Canada, until the twentieth century. Within countries, even the short-term responses to  
TABLE 3 
LAWS GOVERNING THE FRANCHISE AND THE EXTENT OF VOTING IN 
SELECTED AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1840-1940 
 






   In  Balloting     Population 
Voting 
          
 1840-80        
Barbados  1857    Y         1.0% 
Chile  1869  N  Y  Y    1.6 
 1878  N  N   N
1    -- 
Costa Rica  1890  Y  Y  Y    -- 
Ecuador  1848  Y  Y  Y    0.0 
  1856  Y  Y  Y    0.1 
Grenada  1854    Y      0.6 
Jamaica  1863    Y      0.3 
Mexico  1840  Y  Y  Y    -- 
Peru  1875  Y  Y  Y    -- 
Uruguay  1840  Y  Y  Y    -- 
  1880  Y  Y  Y    -- 
Venezuela  1840  Y  Y  Y    -- 
  1880  Y  Y  Y    -- 
          
Canada  1867  Y  Y  N    7.7 
 1878  N  Y  N  12.9 
          
United States  1850  N  N  N  12.9 
 1880  N  N  N  18.3 
 
 
        
          
 1881-1920        
Argentina 1896  Y Y  Y       1.8%
2 
 1916  N  N  N  9.0 
Brazil 1894  Y  Y  Y  2.2 
 1914  Y  Y  Y  2.4 
Chile 1881  N  N  N  3.1 
 1920  N  N  Y  4.4 
Colombia  1918
3  N N N  6.9 
                                                
1 After eliminating wealth and education requirements in 1878, Chile instituted a literacy requirement in 
1885, which seems to have been responsible for a sharp decline in the proportion of the population who 
were registered to vote. 
2 This figure is for the city of Buenos Aires, and likely overstates the proportion who voted at the national 
level. Costa Rica  1912  Y  Y  Y  -- 
 1919  Y  N  N  10.6 
Ecuador 1888  N  Y  Y  2.8 
 1894  N  N  Y  3.3 
Mexico 1920  N  N  N  8.6 
Peru 1920  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Uruguay 1900  Y  Y  Y  -- 
 1920  N  N  N  13.8 
Venezuela 1920  Y  Y  Y  -- 
          
Canada 1911  N  N  N  18.1 
 1917  N  N  N  20.5 
United States  1900  N  N  Y
4  18.4 
 1920  N  N  Y  25.1 
 
 
        
          
 1921-40        
Argentina  1928  N  N  N      12.8% 
 1937  N  N  N    15.0 
Bolivia  1951  -  Y  Y     4.1 
Brazil  1930  Y  Y  Y     5.7 
Colombia 1930  N N N    11.1 
  1936  N  N  N     5.9 
Chile  1920  N  N  Y     4.4 
  1931  N  N  Y     6.5 
  1938  N  N  Y     9.4 
Costa Rica  1940  N  N  N   17.6 
Ecuador  1940  N  N  Y     3.3 
Mexico 1940  N  N  N    11.8 
Peru 1940  N  N  Y    -- 
Uruguay 1940  N  N  N    19.7 













United States  1940  N  N  Y  37.8 
 
Notes and Sources:  Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 2000. 
                                                
 
3 The information on restrictions refers to national laws. The 1863 Constitution empowered provincial state 
governments to regulate electoral affairs. Afterwards, elections became restricted (in terms of the franchise 
for adult males) and indirect in some states.  It was not until 1948 that a national law established universal 
adult male suffrage throughout the country.  This pattern was followed in other Latin American countries, 
as it was in the U.S. and Canada to a lesser extent. 
4 Eighteen states, 7 southern and 11 non-southern, introduced literacy requirements between 1890 and 
1926.   TABLE 4 
LITERACY RATES IN THE AMERICAS, 1850-1950 
 
 Year  Ages  Rate 
      
Argentina  1869  +6      23.8% 
 1895  +6  45.6 
 1900  +10  52.0 
 1925  +10  73.0 
      
Barbados 1946  +10  92.7 
      
Bolivia 1900  +10  17.0 
      
Brazil 1872  +7  15.8 
 1890  +7  14.8 
 1900  +7  25.6 
 1920  +10  30.0 
 1939  +10  57.0 
      
British Honduras  1911  +10  59.6 
(Belize) 1931  +10  71.8 
      
Chile 1865  +7  18.0 
 1875  +7  25.7 
 1885  +7  30.3 
 1900  +10  43.0 
 1925  +10  66.0 
 1945  +10  76.0 
      
Colombia 1918  +15  32.0 
 1938  +15  56.0 
 1951  +15  62.0 
      
Costa Rica  1892  +7  23.6 
 1900  +10  33.0 
 1925  +10  64.0 
      
Cuba 1861  +7  23.8 
(38.5,5.3)* 
 1899  +10  40.5 
 1925  +10  67.0 
 1946  +10  77.9 
      
Guatemala 1893  +7  11.3 
 1925  +10  15.0 
 1945  +10  20.0 
      
Honduras 1887  +7  15.2  1925  +10  29.0 
Jamaica 1871  +5  16.3 
 1891  +5  32.0 
 1911  +5  47.2 
 1943  +5  67.9 
 1943  +10  76.1 
      
Mexico 1900  +10  22.2 
 1925  +10  36.0 
 1946  +10  48.4 
      
Paraguay 1886  +7  19.3 
 1900  +10  30.0 
      
Peru 1925  +10  38.0 
      
Puerto Rico  1860  +7  11.8 
(19.8,3.1)* 
      
Uruguay 1900  +10  54.0 
 1925  +10  70.0 
      
Venezuela 1925  +10  34.0 
      
Canada 1861  All  82.5 
Eng-majority counties  1861  All  93.0 
Fr- majority counties  1861  All  81.2 
      
United States       
North Whites  1860  +10  96.9 
South Whites  1860  +10  91.5 
All 1870  +10  80.0 
(88.5,21.1)* 
 1890  +10  86.7 
(92.3,43.2)* 
 1910  +10  92.3 
(95.0,69.5)* 
 
*The figures for Whites and Non-Whites are reported respectively within parentheses. 
 
 
Source : Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 2000. 
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laws extending suffrage were significant in terms of increasing the proportions of the 
population voting.  For example, after the literacy requirement in Chile was removed by 
the 1874 constitution (an action reversed in 1885), the proportion of voters in the 
population more than tripled within a few years.  In Argentina, the 1912 reform that 
introduced the so-called ￿Australian ballot￿, with secrecy and standardized public ballots, 
as well as universal and compulsory suffrage for men over eighteen, led to a rapid and 
dramatic increase in political participation, as ￿voting increased threefold or fourfold in 
the parliamentary elections of 1912, 1913, and 1914, and rose still further in the 
presidential elections of 1916￿.
37   Indeed, the change in the law is generally credited with 
being responsible for an historic defeat of the long dominant National Autonomist Party 
(PAN) and the election of the presidential candidate of the principal opposition Radical 
Civic Union.  Such evidence that the extent of the franchise mattered both quantitatively 
and qualitatively is consistent with the observation that intense political debates normally 







The record of suffrage in the Americas highlights a series of fundamental 
questions about the evolution of political institutions.
38  What factors account for the 
systematic variation across the societies of the New World in the tightness of the  25
restrictions on whom was eligible to vote, and in the fraction of the population that 
voted?  What factors accounted for the variation in form of the restrictions over place and 
time, and did they matter?  What were the effects of these restrictions within the 
respective societies?   
These important issues, and the relevance of the evidence reviewed here, deserve 
further study.  Nevertheless, a few observations seem warranted at this point.  First, as 
regards the existence and sources of systematic variation in the extent of suffrage, there 
seems no doubt that although there were some striking parallels across the New World 
societies in their suffrage institutions, especially during the colonial period, some clear 
patterns in the differences between them are evident.  In particular, states or countries 
with greater homogeneity or equality (broadly defined) among the population tended to 
extend the franchise earlier and more broadly  -- contributing to the evolution, or 
persistence, of a more equal distribution of political influence.  This general regularity is 
suggested not only by the contrast between the English colonies on the North American 
mainland and the Spanish colonies throughout the New World, but also by the variation 
in experience across the states/societies with the same national heritage.  It was, for 
example, the western or frontier states within the U.S., where labor was relatively scarce 
and both human and non-human capital relatively equally distributed, that took the lead in 
doing away with wealth or income-based qualifications for the franchise and establishing 
universal white manhood suffrage.  Moreover (if perhaps trivially), the binding 
qualifications that were retained for males --based on race ￿ applied to a smaller fraction 
of the population in those states where the population was more homogenous.    26
Why the states in the U.S. at first moved from economic-based to race-based 
qualifications for suffrage, instead of the Latin American pattern of going from 
economic-based to literacy-based qualifications, is a fascinating and important question.  
Although eliminating economic-based qualifications, such as land, other forms of wealth, 
income, or taxes paid, extended the franchise to some groups, the adoption of the new 
sets of qualifications were clearly intended by those who played a role in designing the 
new laws to disfranchise other groups.  It is not obvious that the elites in the North 
American states/societies were more ideologically committed to broad suffrage than their 
counterparts to the South.  Both acted to exclude a segment of the male population that 
was perceived to be very distinct.  In the U.S., this distinct class composed a smaller 
proportion of the population than the distinct classes of most of the Latin American 
societies did.  The situation in the U.S. was perhaps also different from Latin America in 
that until the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments race could be explicitly specified as a 
qualification for suffrage.  In Latin America, for whatever reason -- perhaps cultural, 
perhaps due to the greater continuity in the racial distribution of the population -- explicit 
use of race or ethnic background as a requirement for suffrage does not seem to have been 
feasible.  The Latin American pattern (excepting Argentina) of employing literacy as a 
requirement for suffrage (and citizenship) not only served the purpose of excluding large 
fractions of the respective populations from voting, but may also have had the effect of 
discouraging elites, and the societies they dominated, from investing in the establishment 
of an extensive system of public schools.    
At least at the national level, the hypothesis that societies with greater 
homogeneity or equality tended to adopt suffrage institutions that provided broader  27
suffrage or a more equal distribution of political influence seems to be consistent with a 
preliminary examination of the historical record in Latin America.  Those countries that 
are thought to have long had more homogenous populations, as well as greater equality, 
such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, were the first to implement suffrage 
institutions associated with greater access to and use of the franchise.  Although this 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis, the limited information available means that this 
is but a weak test.  More evidence needs to be retrieved.  It would be especially 
interesting to identify the variation in suffrage institutions across the provinces/states of 
Argentina, Colombia, and other countries that -- like the U.S. -- allowed such 
jurisdictions to set the qualifications for voting. 
Finally, there is the question of whether the patterns in how the suffrage 
institutions evolved made a difference for long-run patterns of economic development.  In 
theory they should have, if voters had systematic preferences about the economic policies 
that were on the agenda and if the governments (in these nominal democracies) were 
influenced by the preferences of the voters.  There is a vast literature suggesting that 
governments are responsive to the preferences of their respective electorates, and the 
salient case of the losses suffered by blacks in the U.S. South when they were effectively 
disfranchised by the diffusion of literacy tests and poll taxes between 1890 and 1910 (to 
cite a familiar and well accepted example) seems highly relevant to the contexts 
considered here.
39  Moreover, we have argued elsewhere that the variation in the extent of 
the franchise across the societies of the New World was associated with investment in 
public schooling and literacy attainment ￿ even after controlling for per capita income.
40  
This association, if it reflects a more general relation between the distribution of political  28
influence and public policies, would suggest that the evolution of suffrage institutions 
might encompass a mechanism by which relative differences across societies in the extent 
of inequality generally might persist over time, and might ￿ in the case of New World 
economies ￿ help to understand differences in rates of economic growth over the long 
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the proportion of the population eligible to vote may have decreased over the late-eighteenth century 
because of the growing numbers of relatively poor urban workers.  29
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Although many observers of that time noted how the new states, and especially those in the West, were 
more democratic in their suffrage laws and in other respects, Frederick Jackson Turner (1906) and (1920) 
was perhaps the first major scholar to devote much attention to the question of why.  Williamson (1960) is 
skeptical of the notion the West was unique, however, and has suggested that the prevalence of universal 
suffrage in the frontier states may have been due to the difficulty of establishing freehold rights in a newly 
settled area where land titling was imperfect and recent. See McCormick 1960 for estimates of the 
proportion of adult white males who voted, and for discussion of the variation over time and state in voting 
participation.  He too is uncertain that the western states were all that different from those in the East.  
15 See the discussion in Keyssar 2000.   
16 The significance of this incentive to liberalizing the franchise is dramatically illustrated by the movement 
of states in the upper Midwest, such as Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Kansas, and Minnesota, to liberalize 
residency requirements for aliens to make it easier for them to vote.  After Wisconsin (which had the 
highest proportion of foreign born in its population of any state in 1850) moved first in 1848, Michigan and 
Indiana soon followed. See the discussion in Keyssar 2000: 33.  
17 This was less true in the southern states, but the extension of suffrage to all adult white males had the 
additional benefit in such areas of strengthening solidarity among the white population.  See Davis and 
North 1971 for discussion of the Northwest Ordinance; and Gates 1968 for discussion of land policies.  
Support for public schools as well as easing the formation of banks and provision of banking services might 
be considered as other means of offering greater opportunities to potential migrants.  Although many other 
factors were involved and the relationships complex, the West had a rather good record overall. For 
evidence on regional patterns in the development of public schools, and in the regulation of entry into the 
financial sector, see Fishlow 1966 and Rockoff 1974.  Of perhaps particular relevance here is Fishlow￿s 
account of how it was in the West that the public sector played an especially important role in promoting 
primary schooling during the antebellum period.  The subsidy to schooling provided by the Northwest 
Ordinance, embodied in the setting aside of land, may have contributed to this pattern.     
18 For evidence of the relative equality of populations in frontier states, see Soltow 1975; Newell 1986; and 
Kearl and Pope 1986.  Also see  Galenson and Pope 1989 for evidence on the returns accruing to early 
settlers from in-migration to frontier or labor-scarce areas.   
19 Porter 1918; Williamson 1960;  McCormick 1960; and Keyssar 2000.  
20 The changes in these state constitutions to extend the suffrage (if not lower the very high wealth 
requirements for holding office) were highly controversial, with the alignments in favor and in opposition 
not corresponding all that strongly with political party.  In Maryland, the change is not thought to have had 
a major impact on the size of the electorate, largely because of the previously limited enforcement of the 
economic qualification, and because inflation had eroded the import of the threshold estate value. Some 
other reforms dealing with the conduct of elections, such as the introduction of balloting (as opposed to 
voice votes) and the expansion of the number of polling places were also introduced at about the same time. 
In South Carolina, the movement for suffrage reform coincided with concern about the possibility of war 
with Britain and seems to have benefited somewhat from the view that those who bore arms in the militia 
should be able to vote.  See Williamson, chpt. 8. 
21 Mississippi, in 1817, was the last state to enter the Union without universal adult white male suffrage, and 
from then on the maintenance of economic-based restrictions was largely a holding action.  Many of the 
original thirteen states replaced wealth qualifications with tax-based requirements (which endured in some 
states for a very long period), but it is not clear how binding they were in general.  Of course, the use of poll 
taxes expanded greatly in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a way of obstructing blacks 
and immigrants from voting. 
22 See the discussion in Keyssar 2000, chpt. 3. 
23 See the discussion in Porter 1918, chpts 2-4, and Stampp 1990, p 134.  In some states, Indians who were 
living in tribes or who had not paid taxes were specifically excluded from voting. 
24 Porter 1918, pp. 50-51. 
25 See the discussions in Porter 1918; Williamson 1960; and Chute 1969.  Most of the so-called founding 
fathers were believers in property requirements.  Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson were in the 
minority.  30
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 See Keyssar, pp. 71-76, for a discussion of the Dorr War in Rhode Island.  He generally argues that the 
emergence of a significant working class population made the question of whether to do away with 
economic qualifications a much more problematic proposition for elites.   
27 Ohio seems also to have had a low rate of voting before 1824, but not afterwards.  It is not clear why.  It 
did maintain a requirement that adult white males had to have paid a state or county tax, or been compelled 
to labor on the ￿roads￿ in order to have the right to vote.  That requirement was not repealed until 1851, 
however, long after the rate of voting had risen sharply to levels above the regional average. 
28 This is the key proposition that McCormick wanted to establish. 
29 The evidence of high rates of voting in local and state elections, despite the presumably high cost of 
going to the polls in that era, is consistent with the impressions offered by Tocqueville.  For a discussion of 
the beginning of the long-term decline in voter particpation during the late-19
th century, see Kornbluh 2000. 
30 Porter, chpt. 4.   
31 The institution of literacy tests was not confined to the South.  Eighteen states, seven southern and eleven 
non-southern, introduced literacy requirements between 1890 and 1926.  They were directed primarily at 
blacks and immigrants. 
32 See Kousser 1974. 
33 It is relevant to note that after emancipation, the British colonies in the West Indies generally increased 
the levels of wealth required to be eligible to vote.  The result, as seen in Table 3, was very low proportions 
of the population voting in elections. 
34 See, for example, the discussions in Stein and Stein 1970;  Lockhart and Schwartz 1983; and Bayle 1952. 
35 Stein and Stein 1970, chpt. 6. 
36 See the discussion of the evolution of constitutions within the various countries in Fitzgibbon 1948.  In 
addition to restrictions on who can vote, there are many other practices that tend to reduce voter 
participation or increase the relative influence of the well-to-do or more powerful in elections: lack of 
secrecy in voting, whether accomplished through a formal procedure of voting in public or through other 
means; buying of votes (especially where secrecy is compromised); selective placement of voting places; 
intimidation of selected classes of the population; or fraud in the handling or counting of votes. These 
phenomena are of course present, at least to some degree, wherever votes are held. For example, see 
Albright 1942 for a discussion of how some of the problems concerned with the ballot were confronted in 
the U.S. over the 19
th century.  Many observers have suggested that such practices were more prevalent in, 
and may have long endured, in many Latin American countries, and that they help account for why voter 
participation was sometimes low even when formal restrictions on who held the franchise were not so 
binding.  For example, the substantial increase in the proportion of the people who voted in Argentina after 
1912 is normally credited more to the change in the law related to the conduct of elections (replacing a 
system of public voting in a limited number of voting places with a secret standardized ballot in an 
expanded set of voting places), than to the institution of a legal requirement that all adult male citizens vote.  
37 Gallo 1993: 109. 
38 At 1900, most European countries had markedly higher fractions of the total population voting in 
elections than any of their peers in Latin America (with the exceptions including Austria, Finland, Italy, and 
Sweden), with a few actually exceeding the figures for the United States and Canada (Belgium at 22 
percent, France at 19.4 percent, Norway at 19.5 percent, and Switzerland at 22.3 percent).  The 
backgrounds to their respective extensions of the franchise were quite different however.  Perhaps the 
central question is why elites choose to dilute their political influence or power by extending suffrage to 
members of non-elite groups.  In Europe, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) have argued, decisions to 
broaden the franchise during the 19
th and early-20
th centuries did not typically occur until there were threats 
to civil order.  In a sense, elites preserved the peace by agreeing to share political influence more equally. 
The extension of suffrage was, in turn, frequently followed by changes in social policy that favored those 
groups that had realized increases in their political influence.  See Justman and Gradstein (1999) for a 
related, but different view.  In contrast to this pattern, the decisions to extend the right to vote in countries 
such as the United States, Canada, and Australia were arrived at without much in the way of violence or 
threats of violence (the experience in Rhode Island notwithstanding).  If we presume that elites are acting in 
their own best interest, the implication is that their assessment of what is in their interest may involve 
variables other than their political power. See Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff (1999) for the estimates of 
the proportions of the population voting in various countries in Europea dn the Americas, as well as for  31
                                                                                                                                                                             
more detail about developments in Canada and latin America.  For a discussion of the background to the 
extension of the franchise in Australia, see McNaughtan 1975.  Australia made a relatively rapid transition 
to universal adult white male suffrage, but like virtually all of the societies established as colonies by the 
Europeans, it effectively denied the franchise to most racial minorities ￿ such as Aborigines or Pacific 
Islanders --  until the 20
th century.  
39 Powerful examples of how changes in the composition of the electorate can lead to changes in 
government policy are detailed in Kousser 1974 and Lott 1999. 
40 Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 1999. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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